ATGs grava naivitet gällande risken för korruption del3
Här börjar det nu bränna till ytterligare, hela utredningen är finurligt skriven, där kritiken är mild i början och förståelse samt insikt om problematiken är väsentlig, desto längre man läser i utredningen, desto tydligare blir kritiken av ATG såsom spelbolag. !!
Bland annat så har det varit legio att vid kvällstävlingar så har det saknas en beslutsfattande överordnad, samt ingen av de som haft beslutanderätt har varit tillgängliga vid problem.
Detta är troligtvis numera förändrat och förbättrat.
Intressant är även att Lotteriinspektionen jämförelsevis med internationella tillsyn/övervakningsorgan är i avsaknad av inflytande över hästsporten (ST,SG,ATG), så är INTE fallet internationellt, vilket är olyckligt då sporten nu utreder sig själva vid misstanke om oegentligheter.(37)
Mycket viktigt är att Utredningen påvisar den STORA risken av korruption och påverkan av framförallt V75s utfall, enär det är även med internationella mått en osedvanligt stor spelpott. Det är nödvändigt att ATG utformar en spelsäkerhetsprotokoll och kontroll över abnorma spel och stora förändringar i spelvolymer och oddsförändringar. (39)
Här följer nästa del av Paul Scotneys utredning för Lotteriinspektionen i syfte att utreda ATGs utlandsspel.
Conclusions
28. The recommended systems and processes changes contained within this document, including those outlined in the SGA injunction will help either prevent the previously referred to incidents happening again or at the very least ensure the more effective post management of them.
29. However the investigation team of the view that other changes should be considered by the ATG, particularly around how the company is structured. The reason being that the anomalies around tote management, specifically not having the right decision maker on duty at the time and not being a part of the same team most probably negatively impacted on the management of some incidents of concern, particularly the Churchill Downs incident. In relation to some of the other incidents involving foreign tote operators, another anomaly appears to be an over reliance on the international team to sort out problems with international partners even though they may be caused by an IT or communications failing.
30. A specific observation of the investigation team is that the present ATG structure does not seem to have one senior person overseeing the operational elements of the business; instead the operational functions are spread across a number of functional areas which are more akin to support functions (IT, Security etc.). This is out of line with other similar organisations who usually has an identified ‘Head of Operations’ (although the name will vary).
31. Based on the experience of the investigation team (with the knowledge of how tote systems are managed in other jurisdictions’) our recommendation is for ATG to consider having one person within the organisation who has the dedicated functional responsibility of overseeing all operational elements of betting and tote management, including the line management of all individuals relevant to this function – with equal focus on the international and national elements of the business.
32. Ideally this person should have an extensive knowledge of the subject both from a national and international perspective and should be independent from the Security and IT Departments. As suggestion the creation of an Operations Department (as
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referred to above in paragraph 29) would be one option, with the head reporting directly to the Chief Executive – which appears to be in line with the other functional heads outlined in the documents provided to the investigation team.
33. In relation to the international team their focus should essentially be about liaising with, and retaining existing international partners and establishing new ones and not being central to resolving the inevitable tote-related problems when they arise. They can of course assist but the structures in place should ensure all of the resources within ATG are available to assist them.
34. In essence this would mean any future problems that ATG experience within the international tote environment would be managed by the operations department with assistance from the International, security and IT departments.
35. As the investigation team spent such a relatively short time at ATG they are reluctant to be more specific about further organisational changes.
36. One area that the investigation team was left unsighted on was the strength of the relationship between ATG, the Swedish Trotting Association and the Swedish Jockey Club. Whilst it was not specifically a part of our remit to look into this area (or sufficient time) the investigation team makes the following observations based on their extensive experience of dealing with betting-related corruption in sport. The experience of other countries (like Great Britain and the US) is that it is vital there exists a robust relationship between betting operators and sport; this includes written protocols around information sharing when suspicious betting activity occurs. It is also important that the sport in question has the right structures and processes in place to investigate any possible corruption that is separate and complementary to what the police may do.
37. It was a surprise to the investigation team that the SGA does not have any influence over either the Swedish Trotting Association or the Swedish Jockey Club. This is not the case in other countries, for example the Gambling Commission in Great Britain has a central role in ensuring both the betting operators (including the privately owned tote) and the sport cooperates when there is any suggestion of corruption.
38. This includes the powers to assist both parties in an investigation. There is also legislation in place that requires the cooperation between all of these parties especially around information sharing and investigating malpractice under the rules of the sport.
39. The reason the investigation team feels it appropriate to raise this issue is should ATG have in place all the necessary ‘checks and balances’ outlined in this report they will count for little if there is corruption within the sport that is not being adequately addressed. Given the large amount of money that is at stake in Swedish trotting (the V75) manipulation of the sporting event is a very real possibility.
ATG will eventually have in place a betting monitoring system that has the ability to identify suspicious betting on trotting in Sweden which when it happens may be the result of corruption in the sport. If the sport does not have the expertise or resources to deal with it then the problems will in the very least persist and in the more worryingly cause long run damage to the reputation of the sport.
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40. In Great Britain British Horseracing has a fully resourced integrity unit which was established 10 years ago after a number of betting-related corruption scandals – which almost destroyed the sport. The Swedish Trotting Association or the Swedish Jockey Club may have adequate systems and processes in place but if they have not now is the time to reconsider their position. In Great Britain it would be the role of the Gambling Commission (and the Government) to put pressure on the sport to do this, it is unclear who would do that in Sweden.
41. In the light of the above comments the investigation team would urge the SGA to put pressure on whoever they consider appropriate to ensure there is a strong and meaningful relationship between ATG and the Sweden Jockey Club to have the confidence that any suspicions of corruption are being adequately investigated. An appropriate consideration would be an independent ‘risk assessment’ of the sport around all of these areas.
Fortsättning följer, kritiken blir allt allvarligare och tydligare förknippad med REJKBACK/Rabattbolagen desto längre in i utredningen vi kommer.
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